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Abstract
A multitude of views characterize what should or should not be done about climate
change, and in the past decades, nations have acted very differently in the face of climate
change. This study explores factors that affect individuals' attitudes and concerns towards
the environment and how those attitudes ultimately affect climate change policy. One
model investigates the link between individual attitudes and countries' actions on climate
change, and the results show that attitudes indeed matter in the implementation of policy.
Different measures of democracy such as freedom of the press also prove to be important
as channels for these attitudes. A second model identifies a number of political, socio
economic and demographic characteristics that matter for people's attitudes towards
climate change.
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Be the Change You Wish to See·:
National Attitudes and Climate Change Policy

"Unless someone like you cares a whole awful lot,
Nothing is going to get better. It's not."
-

Dr. Seuss, "The Lorax"

1. INTRODUCTION
The continuous and rapidly increasing overuse and destruction of natural resources are a
serious threat both to human beings and to the planet we inhabit. Climate change is one
such threat, and because it is closely linked with our current lifestyles, it is also a very
contentious issue. A multitude of views characterize what should or should not be done
about climate change, and some nations have done much more about climate change in
the past decades than others. For example. the European Union countries have taken a
lead in the development of climate change policy and emissions trading, although many
of them will have trouble meeting their reduction commitments (WBCSD, 2006).
America. by contrast, as one of the world's largest economic units, as well as the most
energy and carbon intensive economy on a per capita basis, has yet to commit to
significant reductions of greenhouse gas emissions and has in fact increased emissions
• ''YOU must be the change you wish to see in the world"
- quote by Mahatma Gandhi

since 1990. China, as the world's biggest producer of coal and a country with soaring oil
consumption has rapidly increasing greenhouse gas emissions and many experts expect
China's total emissions to overtake America's by the middle of the century. Japan is
committed to reducing emissions by 6% from 1990 levels, and is hoping to capture
emerging markets for new, cleaner energy.
Since climate change may have extraordinary and probably irreversible impacts
on society and the planet, an interesting question to investigate is why countries behave
so differently. AJe actions this diverse because people in different countries have
different attitudes towards climate change? Do actions differ because of differences in the
translation of these attitudes into action? Is it some combination of the two, or some other
factor altogether? This project sets out to investigate the effect of a number of social,
economic and political characteristics on individuals' attitudes and concerns about the
environment., and the effect of such individual attitudes on countries' actions on climate
change. It seems important to understand what makes individuals and countries more
likely to be concerned with protecting the environment, since such an understanding
might allow us to imagine policies that will balance out the costly struggle between
humanity and the environment.
Climate change represents a particularly interesting and difficult area of
environmental policy because it involves a global public good that bas a long latency
period between actions and consequences. Public goods exhibit two important
characteristics for our pllIposes: they are non-rival and non-excludable. Non-rivalness
means that the consumption of a public good by one individual does not decrease the
amount of the good available to others, and non-excludability means that it is impossible
to exclude anyone from consuming the good. Because of these two characteristics, an
individual who helps produce a public good can never fully take advantage of the benefits
of that

productio~

i.e., there are positive externalities to its production. The other side of

this issue, often called the "free rider" problem, is that individuals can reap the benefits of
a public good without contributing to its creation, since they cannot be excluded from
consuming the good.
A global public good is one that has universal benefits, so that the benefits of its
production spill over to countries and populations all over the world. For "national"
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public goods, national policy intervention can, to a certain extent, correct for these
externalities. For global goods, however, no national policy mechanism is present, and no
international organization has the force to impact change in the same way that a nation
can, which makes these goods even more likely to be undersupplied.
As a policy target, climate change also has an important temporal component. The

implications of the long-lived aspect of climate change will be discussed in depth in the
section about time discounting. We will see that because of these three characteristics, it
is far from obvious that linkages between attitudes and environmental behaviors that
might characterize a problem with more immediate and local consequences would
similarly characterize the relationship with climate change.
I estimate two different models to examine these issues. The first model uses
survey data to empirically examine what factors matter in determining the formation of
environmentalism. Three examined dimensions include the foooation of environmental
attitudes, environmental behavior, and willingness to pay for the environment. The
second model employs macro data to examine the relationship between the attitudes of a
country's citizens and the magnitude of its action on climate change. In both of these
models, I attempt to tease out the net effects of the three attributes (global, public, and
long-term) of climate change.
The economic literature to date has focused on the relationship between wealth
and environmental concerns as the main determinant of environmental concerns and
attitudes. Little consensus has emerged on the topic, with some authors finding that the
increase of environmental concern is a global phenomenon, occurring in developed and
developing countries alike, and others arguing that environmental concern is highly
correlated with GDP per capita.
What sets this project apart from the previous literature is not only that the
attitudes model is based upon survey data, but also that these micro data allow me to
examine the influences of individual characteristics such as information, socio-economic
characteristics, political and religious values, time preferences, and risk perception on the
formation of environmental attitudes or on action on greenhouse gas emissions. Stern
(1992) notes that individual choices merely account for a small part of the proximate
causes of global environmental change, and that the study of consumer behavior thus can
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yield only partial knowledge about the causes of large-scale environmental change. He
acknowledges, however,

that "a neglected,

but potentially important area for

psychological research concerns the role of individuals in determining what firms,
communities, and governments do to the global environment." (p 285) To my knowledge,
the link between individuals' attitudes and their countries' actions has still to be
investigated, and this project sheds some light on precisely that question.
This paper shows that individual concerns about climate change in a country are
significantly associated with lower greenhouse gases. The share of total energy
consumption from coal in 1990 also results in a significant reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions, as does the proportion of people who trust government information about
pollution. Individuals' attitudes also have a stronger effect on greenhouse gas emissions
when their countries have a freer press.
I also find that demand for global, public and long-tenn goods are significant
determinants of individuals' attitudes towards climate change. Education and familiarity
with climate change, liberal political views and urban residency are all positively related
to the probability of being concerned about climate change, whereas household income
and respondent age have the opposite effect. Interesting differences emerge for the two
other models: support for public goods, positive environmental attitudes, years of
education, and liberal political views increase both the probability of cutting down on
driving for environmental reasons, and of being willing to pay to protect the environment.
While household income leads to a fall in the probability of cutting down on driving for
environmental reasons, and has a positive effect on the respondents' willingness to pay
higher prices to protect the environment, it doesn't affect the other measures of
willingness to pay.
Section 2 presents a summary of the economic, psychological and sociological
literature on the topic of environmental attitudes and behaviors. Section 3 presents the
different models used to investigate these links, and Section 4 gives an overview of the
data. Section 5 presents the results of the econometric estimations, and Section 6
concludes and discusses the findings of this study.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing research on environmental concerns consists of two main branches: most
economists focus on country-wide trends, and often on the relationship between
economic activity and environmental concerns or environmental quality; other social
scientists focus on the determinants of individual attitudes towards the environment and
the link between people's attjtudes and their behavior. Since many of these investigations
are based on an interest in the factors that affect environmental quality, it would seem
like a logical next step to raise the question of whether individual attitudes matter in
terms of national policy. To explore this relationship, we need to examine not only how
individual attitudes are fo nned, but also how they translate into countries' actions. The
different reasons why people care about the environment would seem a logical place to
begin such an investigation.

Environmental Concerns

Why Do We Care About the Environment?
Fransson and GMling (1999) provide a thorough overview of the psychological1iterature
on environmental concern. For the purposes of this paper, it is interesting to note that
concern about environmental issues can stem from two rather different value orientations:
instrwnental values and intrinsic values. Whereas instnunental values are based on how
the environment contributes to human welfare, intrinsic values are derived from a deeper
respect for nature, quite apart from the role it plays in improving human lives. Two types
of instrumental values motivate environmental concern: anthropocentric altruism (caring
about consequences for all humans) or self-interest (caring only about consequences for
yourself) - people care about the environment because they believe that a degraded
environment is a risk to hwnan health or to their person, respectively. Intrinsic values can
be derived from underlying beliefs, such as religious beliefs or post-materialist values. As
Stern (1992) notes, individuals can be motivated by several of these concepts at the same
time.
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Different kinds of motivations for environmental concern might produce different
results, depending upon the type of environmental good in question. The self-interest
motivation might result in very strong concerns for current, localized environmental
problems, and indifference toward problems far away in time or in space; someone who
sees the maintenance of a natural balance as a goal in and of itself would care equally
about the two cases.
The economic literature on attitude formation tends to implicitly assume an
egoistic, or at least an anthropocentric, driving force behind environmental concerns, and
examines how people discount issues that are distant in time or in space. These
assumptions have recently been questioned, particularly because they imply certain
things about who is likely to demonstrate environmental concerns, and researchers have
found evidence that seems contradictory to these predictions.

Affluence and the Environment
To date, the economic literature on environmental awareness has focused on the
relationship between affluence and environmental awareness and quality. Much of the
literature has concerned itself with supporting or contesting the Environmental Kuznets
Curve (EKe). The EKC is a hypothesized relationship between per capita income and
environmental degradation, the environmental counterpart to the relationship between
income and inequality proposed by Kuznets in 1955.
This hypothesis has been subjected to a considerable amount of empirical
analysis. One of the earliest studies, conducted by Grossman and Krueger in 1995, found
the hypothesized inverted-U shaped relationship: at low levels of economic activity,
environmental quality worsens as income rises, but, after reaching a turning point, it
ultimately improves with continued income growth. They even anempted to pin down the
level of welfare associated with the turning point, and argued that, for several air
pollutants, the turning point would occur before a country reaches a per capita income of
$8,000. At these later stages, economic development is thought to lead to a structural
transformation in what an economy produces, and how it produces it. In addition, the
higher income facilitates the passage of more stringent environmental laws, and new
technologies are utilized to conserve natural resources. Due to a high income elasticity of
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demand for environmental goods, the wealthier society shifts its attention from basic
needs to less immediate goals, including environmental quality.
This idea that intergenerational changes are shifting the basic value priorities of
given generations towards postmaterialist values has its roots in the psychology literature.
Starting from Maslow's 1954 "basic need hierarchy" (p 15), Inglehart (1971a) argues tbat
once basic physiological needs, such as access to food and the need for physical safety,
have been taken care of, humans begin to pursue other goals - the search for love and
respect, and intellectual and aesthetic pursuits are examples of such higher needs.
Inglehart (1971 b) labels this concept of higher needs ''post-bourgeois'' values (p 991), but
subsequent authors have discussed it under the term "postrnaterialist values."
The post-materialist thesis assigns the credit for rising environmental concern
almost exclusively to these changing values. A corollary of this view suggests that
environmentalism is a predominantly rich-world phenomenon. According to this view,
developing nations haven't yet experienced the affluence and security that are
preconditions for postmaterialist values, which in turn are prerequisites for environmental
concern.
This assumption has been subject to much debate and critique over the past
decade. Martinez-Alier (1995) posits an alternative explanation for why rich countries
may exhibit an increased appreciation for environmental resources and services, namely
that their economic activlt1es are placing an increasing burden on the environment. He
calls this scenario the "effiuents of affluence" (p 220), and states that if this is the case,
then wealth might lead to a paradoxical increase in environmental degradation, in tum
leading to rising awareness and concern for environmental issues.
Brecmn and Kempton (1994) use data on grassroots environmental organizations
and public opinion surveys in developing countries to argue that environmental values are
not merely a product of postmaterialism. They find, contrary to the assumptions of the
previous work, that people from poor countries are as concerned about environmental
threats as citizens in richer countries. They identify several contributing factors, including
first-hand observation of the dangers of environmental degradation. Humanity's impact
on the environment has become so tangible and visible in our lives that most of the
worlds' peoples witness it on a daily basis, and therefore develop a concern about it.
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Dunlap and Mertig (1997) also criticize the postmaterialist theory on the basis that
it assumes a very simple mechanism of "environmental perception" (p 27). Whereas
many authors have focused on the validity of the posttnaterialist thesis, Dunlap and
Mertig reason that the dichotomy typically put forth between postmaterialist values or
exposure to environmental degradation as explanations for environmental concern is a
false one, and that research should concentrate on "unpacking" (ibid, p 27) the complex
ways in which environmental attitudes are formed. They mention several other
psychological and demographic factors that should be considered in any analysis of what
influences environmental concern, and argue that the different geographic and temporal
dimensions of various environmental problems should be taken into account. It appears
that the wealth-driven environmentalism thesis is significantly weakened if the
assumption of a self-interested motivation for caring about the environment is questioned.
We continue oUI discussion by looking at additional reasons for caring about the
environment that mayor may not be products of self-interest.

Discounting - Time and Space

The proximity of a risk, both in time and in space, turns out to be crucial to how much we
care about a particular environmental issue. Since there is a large delay between our
actions and the effects of climate change, the question of discounting is very important:
excessively high discount rates will result in too low levels of precaution and action on
climate change. Investigating both temporal and spatial discounting will set the stage for
our discussion of the question of what individual characteristics might influence
environmental attitudes, drawing upon both the economic and sociological literature.

Private Time Preferences
We begin this investigation by considering the effects of timing of the environmental risk
on attitude fonnation. Since climate change is such a long-lived problem, time
preferences are potentially a very important aspect.
Time preferences play a key role in economic decisions. Where and when to
invest or save or spend, the most obvious connection, is only a small part of the role that
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time preferences play. We are all faced with a wide range of important choices on a day·
to-day basis that force us to evaluate tradeoffs between consequences occurring today,
tomorrow and further in the future. Whether we are aware of it or not, we constantly
compare the benefits (or costs) of our actions, and how their utility varies depending on
whether they occur today or in the future.
The theory of discounted utility is one framework commonly used for the
evaluation of such delayed payoffs. It has been proposed both as a normative model of
behavior, i.e. a description of what people should do, and a descriptive theory, telling us
what people actually do when faced with intertemporal decisions. Both of these
applications are controversial.'
DiscoWlted utility models assume that consumption or rewards in the future are
less desirable than immediate consumption or, similarly, that deferred costs are less
burdensome than costs today. One example of this logic may be that delayed rewards are
perceived as riskier since we cannot know if we will live to reap them. It might also be
the case that we perceive the future as more abstract, and future rewards are therefore
harder to appreciate in advance.
To formalize the role of time preference m a discounted utility framework,
assume that a consumer's well-being depends on the sum of consumption or utility today
and in the future. At each point in time, t, the decision-maker consumes goods crt). These
goods might be summarized by a single consumption budget for period t, or they might
be represented by a vector. Then the subjective value given to the conswner is u(c(t)), a
measure of utility at time period t.
For future consumption, F(r) is the function that describes how the consumer
discounts utility, and 1'is the delay between the current time period and the time of future
consumption. For example, if t is measured in years, the discounted utility function for
consumption in six months would be F( Y2)U(C{t + Y2).
F(r) is usually assumed to be decreasing over

T,

since future consumption is

assumed to be less worth than current consumption. And the more utility is delayed, the
less it is worth.

1

The following formal discussion closely mirrors l..a.tbson (2003)
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Since utility is desirable, by definition, F(r) is

F(O)

= 1, so 1 = F(O) ~ F(r) ~ F(r'),

~

0 for all values of r. We assume

with r' > r> 0

We can then describe an intergenerational indifference curve, the slope of which
corresponds to the utility discount rate. r(r) == - F'(r) where F'(r) is the derivative of F
F(r)
with respect to time, and r( r) the rate of decline in F, i.e., the rate of time preference.
Higher discount rates imply greater decision-maker concern with utility in the current
period relative to future periods.
Most models of discounting involve a constant discount rate regardless of the
length of the delay, but this is not the only option, and it is often used largely for
analytical convenience. The assumption of a constant discount rate implies that
preferences depend only on calendar time, and it is increasingly being questioned. Bishai
(2004) finds little evidence to support a constant discOlUlt rate, and discusses the reasons
for why functions allowing for dynamic inconsistency would be more realistic. For
example, it is easy to imagine young individuals who might be unable to foresee changes

in their time preferences that could lead to changing concerns regarding their future well
being as they get older. Psychological development during the course of a person's life,
which most prople believe (or at least hope) occurs, forces us to reevaluate the constant
discount rate.
Whether preferences are exogenous, as is conventionally assumed, might also be
important. Becker and Mulligan (1997) discuss one endogenous model of time
preferences, similar in some senses to the more familiar throries of human capital
investment. According to this model, people consciously invest in their time preferences
in order to decrease their discount rate because they think that they would be better off if
they were more patient than they currently are. These investments may involve time spent
producing mental images of future pleasures, spending on certain goods, such as
newspapers, which might direct one's attention away from current pleasures towards
future ones, or the purchasing of disciplinary devices such as piggy banks, which assist a
person in sacrificing current consumption.
Although my analysis does not formally depend upon any specific estimate of the
rate oftime preference, or assume a particular functional form for discounting, it is hoped
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that the above discussion will inform the reader as to why the long-lived attribute of
climate change makes it different from environmental issues with more immediate
effects. Also, some of the variables that are included in this analysis of determinants of
environmental attitudes, such as age and years of education, can be thought of as related
to the life-stage discount rate inconsistency that some of the above models imply.

Private Spatial Preferences
Peoples' attitudes towards the consequences of their actions can also be affected by

where these consequences will occur. When we set out to analyze individuals' decisions
concerning environmental issues, we realize that they often have an impact on persons
distant both in time and in space. Where time discount rates are motivated by positive
rates of growth of capital stock, Perrings and Hannon (2001) explain that a positive
spatial discount rate can be rationalized by the diffusion of environmental externalities in
space. They argue that preferences over space can be summarized in a rate of
geographical preference analogous to the rate of time preference, and that it affects

intra generational equity in the way that time preferences affect intergenerational equity.
In other words, a positive rate of time preference implies that current generations assume
only limited responsibility for the effects their actions might have on future generations.
A positive rate of spatial preference similarly implies that people care more about those
who are geographically close to them than about those who are far away.2
The EKe inverted-U shaped relationship between envirorunental quality and per
capita income (outlined above), has been found to be less robust and even absent for
pollution with effects that are distant in space, or not uniformly nearby. With respect to
my focus, climate change, Steininger (2002) cites evidence that C02 emissions in fact
have risen continuously with income. Arrow et a1. (1995) point out that most of the
institutional reforms that have led to lower emissions with rising incomes have been in
the form of legislation to reduce local environmental impacts, often ignoring both
international and intergenerational consequences. Spatial discounting may well be a place

Perrings et al. develop
here.

2

II

formal model of spatial discounting. the details of which will not be discussed
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to look for an explanation of these phenomena, as well as an explanation for the

environmental attitudes investigated in this thesis.
Empirical studies provide some support for the role of spatial discounting. For
example, in his cross-sectional study of poople's willingness to pay for air quality
improvements in connection with a new waste incineration plant in Graz, Austria,
Steininger (2002) finds clear evidence that poople seem more concerned with the
environmental risks in their neighborhoods than with those far away. Interestingly, he
also observes that different income classes' spatial discount rates appear to be different,
and in particular that high income classes discount distant effects more than lower
income classes. This indicates that between income classes, the concern for "the close"
rises with income, as the importance of "the distant" declines. Note, however, that this is
a cross-sectional result, and as such does not say anything about how, as people get richer
over time, their concern for distant environmental impacts changes. Further investigations
of this result are of particular relevance for an issue like climate change, especially
considering the positive correlations found between income and CO2 emissions.

Socilll Preferences
Private and social discounting preferences may of course be different. The optimal social
time discount rate is one that can be seen as sustainable or ethically neutral, and it should
not exceed the net growth rate of the population and of the capital stock. In applying this
principle, however, the measurement of capita! stock matters. Maler (1995) points out

that the rate of discounting should reflect the future productivity of all capital assets, and
not just human-made real capital. Perrings and Hannon (2001), argue similarly that
spatial discounting can be ethically neutral if the discount rate is equal to or less than the
rate at which environmental effects diminish or are diffused with distance.
Bishai (2004) argues that market economies will have an actual rate of investment
equal to the sum of the individual investment decisions, which, in turn, are the result of
individuals' rates of time preference. This mayor may not be equal to the social
optimum, but it is clearly a complex construction. The policy model expanded in this
paper empirically examines a complex aggregate of individual preferences, and whether
or not individuals' attitudes and preferences add up to an influential factor on a national
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level. More precisely, it examines whether individuals' attitudes influence countries'
actions on climate change.

Determinants of Individual Attitudes

VanLiere and Dunlap (1980) and subsequently Fransson et at. (1999) reviewed the
empirical evidence supporting five hypothesized relationships between environmental
concern and socio-demographic variables, specifically age. socia/-class, residence

hypothesis, political ideology hypothesis, and gender. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980)
mention that these variables are the most commonly investigated as determinants of
enviroomenUlI concerns largely because they are routinely included in most surveys. Still,
the authors put forth appealing theoretical explanations for each of the correlates.
Below, we will go into some detail concerning the first four of these relationships.
The fifth, the gender hypothesis, will not be discussed further, as the theoretical
foundations for it is largely missing, and any empirical evidence for it disappears when
general political or cultural values are controlled for.

The age hypothesis states that younger persons tend to be more concerned about
the environment than older persons. One explanation for this is that younger persons are
less integrated in a nation's economic system, or the dominant social order. Solutions to
environmental problems are often seen as threatening to this established order, and
therefore younger people are on average more likely to be in support of such measures
than older individuals. Although the proportion of older people concerned about the
environment seems to be increasing (Fransson et al. (1999) suggest that this is perhaps
due to the media focus on environmental issues, which escapes no age group), the posited
relationship between age and environmental concern remains strong. Another possibility
is that people who care about the environment because of the direct personal benefits that
they will receive from preventing environmental degradation will take into calculation
the amount of time that they will be around to take advantage of those benefits. In other
words, younger people have a longer remaining lifetime, and will therefore reap more
benefits from a healthy environment.
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The social class hypothesis is the idea, discussed in depth in the section about the

EKC, that income is positively related to environmental concerns. Education is often
included in that concept of social class. As we have already stated, the evidence for this
hypothesis is relatively

w~

with wealth having ambiguous effects on environmental

concerns. The nature of the good in question certainly appears to matter, since Steininger
(2002) finds that high income individuals tend to discount environmental problems more
than lower income classes.ifthese problems are occurring far away from home.
Both VanLiere et aI. (1980) and Fransson et al. (1999) largely discredit education
as an explanatory factor because they think of it as part of the larger social class
hypothesis, for which we have only weak evidence. Education might matter for other
reasons, however. Sunstein (forthcoming) suggests that judgments about precautions are
based both on intuitive cost-benefit analysis and on what he calls the "availability
heuristic" (p. 2). If the costs of precaution are high, or the benefits low, these precautions
will appear less appealing. Also, if a particular risk is "cognitively available" (ibid), then
people will be more concerned about that risk.
Cognitive availability has several dimensions. Familiarity with a risk will affect
how available it is, as will salience. Knowledge of a particular issue will, according to
this logic, increase individuals' concerns with the issue. Salience can instead be seen as a
measure of one's experiences with an issue: seeing a picture of a burning house will have
a smaller impact on the risk that you associate with fires, compared to witnessing the fire
first-hand. Education is thought to increase the likelihood of being repeatedly exposed to
a wide range of different issues, therefore also increasing one's concern.
This concept can also be linked to time and space discounting. Sunstein (ibid)
suggests that the availability heuristic can help explain high discount rates, particularly
those associated with issues such as climate change, where the risks are great, but where
they may not be cognitively available (i.e., familiar) to people until it is too late. If salient
events, such as hurricane activity or tidal waves, can be associated with climate change,
the likelihood of a concern for climate change is greatly increased.
The residence hYPolhesis suggests that urban residents are more environmentally

concerned than their rural counterparts, mainly because they are more exposed to the
detrimental effects of environmental problems such as air pollution. The empirical

evidence cited by Fransson et a1. (1999) seems to support this hypothesis, more so than
the studies reviewed by VanLiere et al. (1980). It appears, in fact. that area of residence
has become increasingly important as a determinant of environmental attitudes since the
19805.

The political ideology hypothesis discussed by VanLiere et a1. (ibid) is primarily
based on American partisan affiliations. Although their results are weak, they find some
support for the hypothesis that Democrats tend to be more pro-environmental than
Republicans. In general, liberal self-identification has more empirical support than party
affiliation in the literature. Franssen et al (1999) note that business and industry, which
are

typically

associated

with

conservative

political

ideologies.

often

oppose

environmental efforts due to the costs they have to bear. They also mention as an
explanation the fact that environmental protection entails a certain amount of government
intervention and regulatioJ4 to which conservatives are generally opposed.
Weaver (2002) also finds support for a connection between liberal political views
and postmaterialist values. As mentioned before, post-materialists are thought to shift
their attention from economic and physical security to concerns higher up in Maslow's
(1970) ''hierarchy of needs." This would serve to reinforce the idea that political values
might predict individuals' environmental preferences.
Some additional variables are suggested by the sociology literature. A religion
variable is particularly appealing as a test for intrinsic values. During the past three
decades, the debate surrounding the relationship between religion and environmentalism
has been very lively. It has not made its way into the economic literature concerned with
environmental attitudes, however. Dekker, Ester and Nas (1997) note the possibility that
the West's environmental problems stern from an inherently anthropocentric Judeo
Christian worldview. Several authors have argued this, the most commonly cited being

Lynn White (1967), who states that "our present science and our present technology are
so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our
ecologic crisis can be expected from them alone." (p. 6) In their empirical analysis,
Dekker et a1. (1997) reject the "White hypothesis" and conclude that the relationship
between Christian beliefs and environmental attitudes is not unique. One drawback of
this analysis, however, is that although they had micro-level data available, they
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evaluated it at the country level, potentially missing some useful distinctions within the
Christian community.

Channels

The question of how individual preferences are related to social preferences, as expressed
by a political system, is an important one, but attitudes themselves are unlikely to be the
only factors in the translation process. One can easily imagine a setting where individuals
in a country are very concerned about the environment, but have a government that is
insulated in some way from their beliefs. Different information and political channels
might play an important role in the transformation of individual attitudes into policy.
Due to the EKe, a sort of conventional wisdom has been established (although it
IS

increasingly being questioned) around the idea that an induced policy response

constitutes the main mechanism behind the downward sloping portion of the inverted U
shape. With increasing prosperity, citizens demand less tangible goods to increase their
welfare, and thus governments are under pressure to form policy and regulations that
improve things like environmental quality.
Barrett and Graddy (2000) point out that the posited improvement in
environmental quality rests on much more than economic growth. It also depends on
citizens' ability to acquire information about the quality of their environment, their right
to voice what preferences they might have for environmental services, and on their
government's accountability towards its citizens. Without these, governments would not
have the incentive to satisfy these preferences through policy. Barrett and Graddy find
through an empirical re-anaJysis of Grossman and Krueger's 1995 data that increasing the
level of freedom in a country, at fixed income levels, can have as large an effect on
environmental quality as raising the income per capita. It would seem, then, that basic
civil and politicaJ freedoms are a crucial vehicle for the attitudes a country's citizens,
without which a population could have all the good intentions in the world that still
would not be transfonned into policy.
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3. THE MODELS
3.1 The Attitudes Model
The determinants of individuals' attitudes towards climate change will be investigated in
three parts: with an attitudes model, an action model, and a willingness to pay model. The
three parts correspond to three different dependent variables, and the explanatory
variables are the same, with one ex,ception. The main model is the attitudes model, and it
investigates the determinants of individuals' attitudes toward climate change. The global,
public, and long-lived aspects of climate change set it apart from other environmental
goods, and individuals' preferences for goods with similar attributes are therefore
expected to be good predictors of individuals' attitudes. A few additional broad
categories of individual characteristics that might matter in attitude formation are also
included, specifically information, values,

socio~economics,

and risk preferences.

The following probit model is estimated3 :

P(y

= 11 x) = G (Affinity for

the global community, Support for public goods,

Low demand for long-term goods. Infonnation. Values. Socio-economic

Eq.l

characteristics)

where the independent variables are the different factors that are believed to have an
impact on the dependent variables, as expanded upon below, and Information, Values and

Socio-economic characteristics are vectors of demographic and explanatory variables.

3 A probit model is an econometric model where the dependent variable takes on a one or a zero, and the
coefficients on the independent variables reflect a change in the probability of the outcome associated with
a change in the left-hand side variable. It is possible to estimate a linear relationship between the
categorical dependent variable and the independent variable, but some limitations are associated with that
approach: the fitted probabilities that result can be less than zero or greater than one, and the partial effect
of any variable is constant. Probit models rule out negative or greater-than-one probabilities. and allow for
a non-linear relationship between the outcome and the explanatory variables.
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Dependent Variables

In Eq. 1, G is a cumulative distribution function that for the attitudes model takes

on the value 1.0 for individuals who think that "a rise in the world's temperature caused
by the 'greenhouse effect' is either extremely or very dangerous for the environment" and

o for all others. This variable is called Greenhouse attitudes in what follows. Greenhouse
altitudes is constructed such that those respondents indicating that the greenhouse effect
is Somewhat dangerous, Not very dangerous, Not dangerous at all, and those who can't
choose or decline to answer are assigned a O. The estimation is not sensitive to this
specificatio~

but those respondents who answer Somewhat dangerous areo't believed to

have particularly strong attitudes and are therefore coded as a O.
A second equation will investigate whether the same characteristics have an effect
00

individuals' actions, where G will take on the value 1.0 for individuals who report that

they always or often cut back on driving a car for environmental reasons, and 0 for those
who report that they Sometimes or Never cut back on driving, as well as those who
answer that they doo't have a car. It is important here to acknowledge the possibility that
the survey responses may perfectly reflect actual behavior. Respondents might feel good
about answering that they cut down on driving to protect the environment, the ''warm
glow effect" which would result in an upward bias of the number people who respond
affirmatively to this question. This is one of the reasons that individuals who respond that
they Sometimes cut down on driving are categorized as negative answers (i.e., as not
driving less).
A third line of inquiry will be pursued by examining three different kinds of
willingness to pay for environmental protection: the willingness to pay much higher
prices to protect the environment, the willingness to pay much higher taxes to protect the
environment, and the willingness to accept cuts in one's standard of living to protect the
environment. The dependent variable here is also a categorical variable that takes on a
value of 1.0 for respondents who answer that they are Very willing or Fairly willing to
pay, and a 0 for those who are Neither willing nor unwilling, Fairly Unwilling, or Very

unwilling, as well as those who cannot choose. The ''warm glow effect" is quite likely to
affect respondents' answers to these questions also, and this motivates the above
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categorization. The opposite may be true, referred to as "protest voting" where
respondents may value the environment highly, but state that they would not pay for it,
because they don't agree with one aspect or another of the question - they might object to
the idea of converting the environment into a monetary figure, for example. It is therefore
unlikely to cause a serious bias of the estimates.
With only one exception. the explanatory variables for the three different models
are the same, and they will be described below. The exception is that the action and
willingness to pay models also include greenhouse attitudes as an explanatory variable.

Independent Variables
TABLE 1 - INDEPENDENT v ARlABLES, AmruDEs, ACT/ON AND WILLINGNESS TO PA Y
VARJABLE NAME

Affinity for the global

UNITS

EXPECTED SIGN

1 or 0

+

10rO

+

community
Support for public goods
Low demand for long-term

10rO

goods
Years ofeducation

years

+

Familiarity with climate
change science

lor 0

Belonging to an Abrahamic
religion

1 or 0

Buddhism or Hinduism

lor 0

+

Liberal political views

IorO

+

$

+

Per capita household
income
Age ofrespondent

years

Urban residence

lor 0

+

Greenhouse attitudes

I or 0

+
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As discussed above, the fact that climate change is a global public good with delayed

consequences mean that externalities are present in its

productio~

no policy tools correct

,

for these externalities, and its effects are time discounted. This sets climate change apart
from many other local or short-term environmental services. I therefore seek to test
whether preferences for other global public and long-term goods will be good predictors
of individuals' attitudes about climate change. The concept that climate change has
unique attributes is an important one for two common methods employed to place dollar
values on environmental services: the conjoint and hedonic analysis approaches of
environmental valuation. The hedonic price method for estimating how much people
value environmental goods is based upon the assumption that the value of a good is
related to its attributes. Conjoint analysis looks at how consumers choose among different
combinations of product attributes to determine the relative importance of each attribute.

Affinity for the Global Community
The variable measuring the global aspect of climate change, Affinity for the global

community, is based on a survey question about whether or not an individual agrees with
the statement "for environmental problems, there should be international agreements that
[the survey country) should be made to follow." The variable measures a willingness to
accept restrictions imposed by an international environmental agreement - a dimension
that purely national policies do not need to confront. It is a categorical variable that
assigns the value 1.0 to individuals who strongly agree or agree with this statement, and a

o to

all others,4 The variable is expected to be positively related to an individual's

attitudes about climate change,

Support for Public Goods
The variable measuring preference for public goods, Support for public goods, is based
on whether or not respondents strongly agree or agree with the statement "It is the
responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with
high incomes and those with low incomes." It is a categorical variable that assigns the
Other options were Neither agree nor disagree, Disagree, Srrongly disagree, and those respondents who
answered Can 'r choose, Don 'f know, or refused to answer were also assigned a value of O.

4
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value 1.0 to individuals who strongly agree or agree with this statement, and a 0 to all
others (see footnote 4). Income inequality is used here as a representative non
environmental public good. The literature on individualism suggests that a dichotomy
exists between individualism and collectivism. As a public goocL that exhibits the free
rider problem, I would expect climate change to be valued differently than a private good.
Since a reduction of income inequality in this context involves acquiring more of a public
good, albeit perhaps an imperfect one, this variable is expected to isolate the public goods
aspect of climate change.
Reducing inequality has benefits beyond those of the individuals who benefit
personally from it, and even for those who give up some of their income. This would be
the case if, as Thurow (1971) argues, the distribution of income is an argument in
individuals' utility functions, as it may prevent crime or increase political and social
stability. If we accept t.his argument, each individual in a society faces the same amount
of income distribution. One person's consumption of whatever benefits arise does not
rival anyone else's consumption, and it is impossible to exclude anyone from the
consumption of income distribution. The variable Support for public goods is thus
expected to have a positive sign. It might, however, not be as clean a measure of demand
for a public good as we would want, as it also measures one's attitude towards the poor,
the ability of the government to make a difference, and government intervention in
general.

Time Preference
I am also interested in how time preferences are related to individuals' attitudes towards
climate change issues. This is particularly relevant since climate change is such a long
lived problem. The variable that captures time preferences, Low d.emand for long-tenn

goods, is based on a survey question that asks about an individual's agreement with the
statement "We worry too much about the future of the environment and not enough about
prices and jobs today." It is a categorical variable that assigns the value 1.0 to individuals
who strongly agree or agree with this statement, and a 0 to all others (see footnote 4). It
clearly presents a dichotomy between the future and today, in an especially
environmental context. Agreement with this statement reflects a low demand for long
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tenn goods, or a high discount rate, and the sign of Low demand for long-term goods is
thus expected to be negative.

Information
The role of infonnation in attitude fonnation is thought to have two components: general
knowledge, measured by years of education (Years of education), and subject-specific
scientific knowledge (Unfamiliarity with climate change scien.ce). Following Sunstein
(forthcoming), familiar risks are seen as being more serious than risks that are not

familiar. Education is expected to increase one's familiarity with a range of issues, and
therefore be positively related to the dependent variable. Unfamiliarity with climate

change science is designed to capture familiarity, and is based upon respondents'
opinions about the following statement: "Every time we use coal or oil or gas, we
contribute to the greenhouse effect" (a scientifically correct statement). The variable is a
categorical variable that takes on a value of 1.0 if tbe respondent believes the statement is

Definitely or Probably false, and a 0 if the answer is Definitely or Probably true, as this
indicates a lack of subject-specific knowledge about the science of climate change.
Ignorance about climate change is expected to decrease the availability of the risk, and
therefore also one's attitudes toward that risk. Thus the sign of this variable is expected to
be negative.

Underlying Values
Values are further divided into religious values and political values. Religious values are
represented by two dummy variables: Belonging to an Abrahamic religion for
'Abrahamic religions' and Buddhism or Hinduism for those two religions. The term
Abrahamic religion is used here to refer to the Semitic tradition attributed to Abraham, a
patriarch described in the Torah, the Bible, as well as the Qur'an. This variable thus takes
on the value 1.0 if the respondent belongs to some form of Christianity, Judaism, or
Islam, and 0 for other religions. Consistent with the "White hypothesis," the dualism
between humanity and Dature existent in the Abrahamic religions is thought to establish
that people can exploit nature for their own benefit, and this variable is therefore
conceivably negatively related to environmental concern. Buddhism or Hinduism takes
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on the value 1.0 for individuals belonging to one of those two religions, and a 0 for all
others. The effect of religious beliefs on environmental attitudes is highly disputed, but it
is thought that Buddhism or Hinduism might conversely increase the probability of
considering climate change important, since they do not believe in a duality between
humans and the environment.
Political values are captured by the variable Liberal political views, which
measures political views. Respondents are asked about their political beliefs/affiliation.,
and an in-country analysis subsequently places them in one of a number of categories on

a politicalleftlright spectrum. Liberal political views is a categorical variable that assigns
a 1.0 to individuals whose political affiliation places them in one of the following
categories in the survey: Far left (or communist), Left/center left, or Cenler//iberaI.
Conversely, individuals are assigned a 0 if placed in the categories Right, Conservative,
or For right/fascist. Based on the connection suggested by the literature between liberal
political views and environmental concern, this variable is expected to be positively
related to the dependent variable.

Socio-Economic Characteristics
The socio-economic characteristics that are thought to marter in artitude formation are

Per capita household income, Respondent age, and Urban residence. Per capita
household income is monthly household income divided by the number of people in the
respondent's household, first converted to a common currency (USD) and adjusted for
purchasing power parity using data from the Penn World Tables. The dominant theory in
economics is that environmental concern increases with income, because the environment
is thought to be a luxury good, and low-income families have other priorities more urgent
than environmental concerns. Respondent age has generally in the literature been found
to negatively influence individuals' concerns about the environment. Urban Residence is
a dummy variable for urban living that, based on respondents' descriptions of the place
where they live, categorizes "big city, small city or town", as urban, and "farm or home
in the country" as non-urban. The variable takes on a value of 1.0 for those individuals in
the 'urban' category, and 0 for the non-urban. It is hypothesized that urban living will, in
fact, increase one's sensitivity towards environmental issues. Based on the salience
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aspect of the familiarity criterion, urban residents might be more likely to have
experienced things like pollution and other local environmental issues, and thus would be
more likely to consider environmental issues a risk.

3.2 The Policy Model
In this analysis, I estimate a linear regression model of the effect of private attitudes on
changes in greenhouse gas emissions, Greenhouse gas emissionsl between 1997 and
2000, in country i, using Ordinary Least Squares.

Greenhouse gas emissions; = f(Greenhouse attitudes, Time preference, Per capita
GD?, Freedom ofthe press, Government trust, Share ofcoal, Share ofnuclear,

Eq.2

PRESS*ATT)

Dependent Variables

Greenhouse gas emissionsj is country i's change in green house gas emissions per GDP
(in constant US dollars) in the three-year period preceding the survey years: between
1997 to 2000. 5

5

The specifics of the construction oftbis variable are provided in Appeodix A.
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Independent Variables
TABLE 2 - INDEPENDENT VARlABLES, POLlCY MODEL
VARJABLE NAME

UNITS

Greenhouse attitudes

%

Time preference

%

Per capita GDP
Share oftotal energy
consumption from coal in 1990
Share oftotal energy
production from nuclear in
1990
Freedom ofthe press

$

Government frost

%
%

EXPECTED
SIGN

')

?

#

%

PRESS*AIT -Interaction term
between Press freedom and
Greenhouse attitudes

Greenhouse attitudes is the percentage of people in each country who, in the survey,
report thinking that "a rise in the world's temperature caused by the' greenhouse effect' is
either extremely or very dangerous for the environment." This variable contains the
global and public aspects of climate change and is my direct measure of how attitudes
affect outcomes. Since the hypothesis is that larger proportions of agreement with this
view would be associated with a reduction in emissions, the expected sign of this variable
is negative. 6

Time preference is included in this equation to isolate any separate effect that time
preferences might have on policy in addition to their effect on attitudes, perhaps because
they are more visible through households' actual savings than other kinds of preferences.

Time preference is a measure of adjusted private savings, my proxy for private time
preference. Recognizing that private savings is a function not only of time preference, but
The aggregation of individual attitudes follows Bisbai's (2004) reasoning that in a market economy, the
social rate of time preference is the aggregate of inctividual investment decisions governed by individual
rates of time preference, so the actual social discount rate is a complex. aggregate of individual rates of time
preference. This would logically also apply to things like spatial discounting.

6
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a host of other influences, an adjusted time preference variable is generated. Specifically,
I regress savings on the dependency ratio and GDP and interpret the residual from this
regression as a more pure form of time preferences. According to the life-cycle models of
savings (see e.g. Schmidt-Hebbel, Webb and Corsetti, 1992), demographic variables such
as the dependency ratio should have an effect on savings behavior. The dependency ratio
- the share of the total population of a country that is made up of individuals under the
age of 15 or over 65 - is the demographic variable employed here. It is typically believed
that older people work less and live off past savings, and that children don't bring income
to a household, thus decreasing overall savings. Schmidt-Hebbel et aI. (ibid) also put
forth an alternative explanation that households with many children may save less
because the parents expect their children to support them in their old age. Since higher
preferences for long-term goods would likely mirror a low discount rate, the expected
sign of Time preference is negative.
Incomes should matter both in terms of setting priorities and in the availability of
resources to implement those priorities. Per capita CDP is the per capita income of the
countries in 2000 dollars. Since climate change, and therefore reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions, is presumed to be normal (rather than inferior) goods, this is expected to
have a negative sign (i.e. a greater reduction).
Freedom of the press is a measure created from Freedom House's reports on

freedom of the press that have been conducted for almost 200 countries over the past 25
years. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst). In order to facilitate
interpretation, however, the variable was recoded based on the original data, so that the
worst score would be the lowest, and vice versa. The extent to which the press in a
country is free will measure how well citizens have access to information, and also their
right to voice their preferences for the environment. Consistent with the findings of
Barrett and Graddy (2000), a higher score is expected to lead to greater reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions, i.e., be negatively related to the dependent variable. 7
One question from the SutVey asks how much trust the respondent would have in
government departments to give them correct information about causes of pollution. The
Government trust variable, then, is the percent of people who state that they would have a
7

Some details of how freedom of the press is scored can be found in Appendix A.
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great deal of trust. Whereas the prevIOUS variable measures how accessible the
information is, this variable would measure how trustworthy it is. If citizens do not have
faith in their governments' information about the causes of pollution., they are also
unlikely to believe that their government will act upon their environmental preferences.
The transformation of citizens' attitudes into policy requires that governments act upon
their citizens' preferences, but if individuals don't even have faith in the infonnation that
their government provides on relatively uncomplicated matters as pollution, they are
unlikely to convey those preferences to representatives in the first place.

PRESS·ATTis an interaction tenn between Freedom of/he press and Greenhouse

attitudes. This variable is designed to capture the interaction between freedom of the
press and attitudes. The general premise is that in the absence of a freedom of the press,
attitudes have little chance of being formed and communicated so it would be less likely
that attitudes would result in policy change. The reason for this variable is the possibility
of a significant effect of attitudes on policy that is different for different levels of press
freedom. Generally I expect a freer press to strengthen the effect of attitudes on public
action.

Coal share controls for the share of total energy consumption in country i that
came from coal in 1990. The role of coals is likely to be important, but its sign is
ambiguous. On the one hand countries with a high proportion of coal-based energy could
be expected to typically find it harder and more CQstly to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, meaning that the expected sign would be positive. An alternative line of
reasoning, however, suggests that a low share of energy production from coal might
mirror efforts already taken by the country to reduce environmental impacts. It is
relatively easy to substitute natural gas for coal in electrical generation so in that sense
coal might be an easy target of opportunity. If this is the case, we might speculate that the
marginal costs of reducing emissions might be lower if countries can substitute other
cleaner, widely available energy sources for their coal. These costs would then increase
and make it harder to further reduce emissions as it potentially requires investments in
new technologies, etc. This would imply the opposite sign. It is hard to predict the
coefficient in this case.
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Since the sign of Coal share is ambiguous, Share of nuclear is employed as an
alternative. It is the share of a country's energy production in 1990 that is nuclear energy.
Some countries with high amounts of nuclear energy have argued that treaties forcing
them to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will put them at a disadvantage, because they
have to date invested a great deal in nuclear energy to cut their emissions, and that
reducing them further will be hard - they have already taken advantage oftrus window of
opportunity and now would bear much higher costs. This variable is therefore expected to
have a negative effect on how much countries manage to reduce their emissions, i.e., a
negative sign.

4. DATA

4.1 Data Description
Attitude Models
For the three first models - the attitudes,

actio~

and willingness to pay models - the data

come from the International Social Survey program's 2000 module on the Environment,
conducted in 26 countries on topics surrounding environmental concern. The
participating countries are Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Great

Bri~

Ireland, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands,

New Zealand, Northern Ireland., Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA,8

Policy Model Variables

In the policy model, the data for the dependent variable Greenhouse gas emissionsj come
from World Resources Institute, compiled from the International Energy Agency, the
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center and the Energy Information Agency, and
GDP data from the World Bank.. The data CO2 per GDP measure the quantity of carbon
8 The de1ai1s on how the independent variables correspond to variables in the ISSP survey are provided in
Appendix A.
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dioxide (C0 2 ) released into the atmosphere for each million dollars of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) in each country. The household savings data for the time preference rome
from the DECO Economic Outlook 2000. The GDP data are from the World Bank:, and
the data on dependency ratios comes from the Population Reference Bureau's 2000
World Population Data Sheet. The variables Greenhouse attitudes and Government trust
both come from the ISSP survey.9

Table 3 presents summary statistics for the independent variables for the attitudes model,
the action model, and the willingness to pay model. Table 4 shows summary statistics for
the policy model.

Greenhouse Attitudes comes from the lSSP variable v38, and Government Trust comes from the ISSP
variable v52.

9
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TABLE 3 -DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, AITITUDESA CTION AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY

MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

MINIMUM

Greenhouse attitudes

0.628

0.483

0

Drive Less

0.130

0.337

0

Willingness to pay higher prices

0.066

0.248

0

Willingness to pay higher taxes

0.042

0.200

0

I

Willingness to accept lower standard of

0.055

0.229

0

I

Affinity for the global community

0.898

0.303

0

I

Support for public goods

0.624

0.484

0

I

Low demand for long-term goods

0.368

0.482

0

1

12.3

4.3

0

21

0.158

0.365

0

1

0.725

0.447

0

Belonging to an Abrahamic religion

0.599

0.490

0

1

Buddhism or Hinduism

0.016

0.127

0

1

Liberal political views

0.697

0.460

0

I

Per capita household income ($)

1628.5

4040.3

3.0

83333.3

Log of per capita household income ($)

6.372

1.350

1.1

11.3

Age of respondent

45.8

17.1

15

96

Urban residence

0.702

0.457

0

1

VARIABLE

MAXIMUM

1

living

Years of education
FamiJjarity with climate change science
(A)
Familiarity with climate change science
(B)
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TABLE 4 - DESCRlPTIVE STATISTICS. POLICY MODEL
MEAN

STANDARD
DEVIATION

MINIMUM

MAXIMUM

Greenhouse gas emissions

-0.098

0.089

-0.329

0.063

Percent who consider the green
house effect dangerous

0.639

0.145

0.406

0.879

Private rate ojtime preference

0.000

2.707

-4.065

5.049

Per capita GDP in 2000 dollars

21911.4

14177.3

1173.1

46815.5

Share oJtolal energy
consumption from coal in 1990

0.208

0.144

0.014

0.630

Freedom oJthe press

-20.3

12.3

-60.0

-5.0

Percent who trust government
information on pollution

0.243

0.105

0.078

0.519

VARIABLE

Tables 5 and 6 show pallwlse correlations between the variables of the different models.
In Table 5, the correlations for the attitudes models are shown, and it is not surprising to

note that the correlations between the different kinds of willingness to pay are the highest
- around .5. This is not worrying, however, since these measures are dependent variables
in different models and would thus not result in multicollinearity. None of the other

variables are very highly correlated. In Table 6, the correlations for the policy model are
shown. The only high correlations exist between the variable measuring people's
propensity to cut down on driving, per capita GDP and freedom of the press.
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TABLE 5 - PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS, ArTlTUDES ACTION AND WILLINGNESS TO PAY
Greel:lhouse
Attitude

VAR'A8LES

Drive
less

WTp·
prices

WTPtaxes

I

WTA
lower

SOL

Global

goods

Public
goods

Longterm

Edu

good.s

Un/ami
liarity

Abraha
mic
reliJ!ion

Buddhism
Hinduism

Liberal

HOllsehold
income

Age

Greenhouse
Attitude
Drive less

·0.06

WTP - prices

-0.11

0.07

Wl'P - taXes

-0.09

0.05

0.58

WTA lower SOL

-0.10

0.07

0.43

0.48

Global goods

-0.09

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.03

-0.06

-0.01

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.07

0.06

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

-0.03

-0.04

0.11

Educatio"

0.03

0.05

0.05

0.06

0.03

0.06

-0.14

-0.20

U,yamiliol'ity

0.16

-0.02

·0.03

-0.03

-0.02

-0.12

·0.07

0.05

0.00

S,lpport for
public good
Long-term
goods

II

Abrahamic
religion

I

0.00

0.02

0.00

-0.01

0.01

-0.03

0.09

0.06

-0.10

-0.Q3

~uddhism/lJindu

I

-0.03

0.01

0.01

-0.01

-0.01

0.00

-0.05

-om

0.01

0.00

-0.16

I

-0.07

0.Q3

0.01

0.02

0.03

om

0.16

-0.01

-0.05

-0.04

0.01

-0.08

0.09

0,02

0.01

0.00

-0.02

-0.01

-0.10

-0.06

0.16

0.00

0.00

-0.03

-0.05

Age

0.05

0.04

-0.01

-0.02

-0.02

0.04

0.06

0.12

-0.24

-0.03

0.02

0.Q7

0.01

0.0\

Urban residence

-0.02

0.00

0.03

0.03

0.02

0.04

-0.04

-0.04

O. \8

-0.02

-0.10

-0.03

0.02

0.04

ISm
L~beral political

vIews
How'ehold
i"come

-0.03
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Urban

TABLE 6 - PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS, POLICY MODEL
VARIABLES

Greenhollse
gas
emissions

Greenhouse
allillldes

Time
preference

Press
freedom

Share of
coal

pcGDP

% wllo
trust gvl.
In 0

Press·
attitudes

Greenhouse gas
emissions
GreeT/house
allitll.des

0.39

0.27

-0.09

-0.02

-0.20

-0.13

-0.22

0.1\

0.13

0.02
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4.2 Cross-National Data Validity
Since this study relies heavily on cross-national survey data, it is important to
acknowledge the problem of comparability that arises from the cross-cultural nature of
the survey. In particular, the possibility of different interpretations of identical
questionnaires should be recognized. A few issues that might arise are the possibility that
meanings of answers to survey questions will be significantly different across different
cultural contexts. This question cannot be answered easily, or definitively, as it also
depends on how the survey is designed. However, by examining correlations between
survey data and known geographic factors, Brechin and Kempton (1994, pp 260-261)
present evidence that responses to environmental surveys measure something real about
environmental views. Since these kinds of responses are a key factor in this examination,
it is a comforting result.
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4.3 Econometric Issues
In a study of something as complex as attitudes, it is almost inevitable that some variables
will be left out of the estimated equation, either due to data availability problems or to the
fact that the researcher has neglected to consider some influence and thus left it out. The
inability to include an important explanatory variable leads to biases in the estimated
coefficients. The error tenn then includes the influence of this omitted variable, making
the error term correlated with the right-hand side variables, instead of being uncorrelated

as is our assumption when we draw conclusions from OLS estimates. I have used a fixed
effects approach in the attitudes models to help solve some of these omined variable
issues. Behnnan and Oliver (2000) note that since fixed effects control for all fixed
factors that are shared in common by groups, in this case nations, they eliminate omined
variable bias, at least at the country level.
Although I cannot eliminate the influence of omined variables on my estimates, I
will discuss some of the possible issues. One example of an omined variable at the
individual level is gender. Although the theory does not predict a systematic difference in
attitudes by gender, it is possible that the data set contains systematic differences,
whereby one gender is more concerned about climate change. If, simultaneously, there
are systematic educational differences by gender, then the estimated effects of education
on attitudes would be biased upward.
Differences between different kinds of urban areas may also be an omitted
variable. There are some urban areas that have very good air quality and plenty of green
areas. In these cities, the effects of environmental issues would seem much more remote
than in dirty, polluted cities. Not controlling for environmental quality of the different
urban areas would then weaken the predicted effect of urban residency on attitudes
toward climate change, and bias the estimates downward.
Another omitted variable that might have an inlluence on the policy model is
media coverage. We can imagine a scenario where the dangers associated with climate
change get a lot of coverage in a nation's media, which influences citizens to think that
climate change is dangerous. It is also plausible that the government at the same time
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decides to take action in the face of the increased publicity, but it does not necessarily
imply that citizens' attitudes were what lead to this change. One way in which I attempt
to deal with the issue of media coverage is through the inclusion of variables measuring
the freedom of the press in a country. It is believed that the freer the press is, the more
likely it is to reflect the attitudes of a nation's citizens.
The use of survey data to detennine attitudes might also include some bias. On a
topic as morally loaded as environmental protection, the risk of response bias in the
survey answers is always a possibility; that respondents may answer the way they believe
the questioner wants them to answer, or the way they think they should answer, rather
than according to their beliefs. This would lead to an upward bias of the estimates of how
much people value the environment

5. RESULTS
5.1 Attitudes Model
Determinants of Greenhouse Attitudes

Table 7 shows the results for the probit model with greenhouse attitude as the dependent
variable. The first column includes the measure of unfamiliarity with climate change
science mentioned above: a respondent's belief that the statement "every time we use
coal or oil or gas, we contribute to the greenhouse effect" is false. Individuals who
answered that this statement was defInitely or probably false were assigned a value of
one, and the variable takes on a zero otherwise. Column 2 contains a different
unfamiliarity variable, based on whether or not the respondent thinks that the greenhouse
effect is caused by a hole in the Earth's atmosphere (a scientifically incorrect belief).
Since the hole refers to ozone depletion, not climate change, believing in that statement
was at first also thought to be a reasonable measure of the respondent's ignorance of the
science of climate change. Individuals who answered that this statement was defmitely or
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probably true were assigned a value of 1.0, and the variable takes on a value of 0.0
otherwise. The difference between the two measures will be discussed below.
Column 1 shows the preferred model, which has country fIxed effects included.
The coefficients of all variables are statistically significant and of the expected signs,
apart from the religion variables and per capita income.
A higher level of education is associated with a higher probability of expressing
concern about climate change, the expected result. One additional year of education at the
mean (12.3) results in a .005 percentage point increase in the probability of thinking that
the greenhouse effect is dangerous, The marginal effects of education were evaluated at
different values than the mean, since it could be the case that an additional year of
education matters more when going from five years to six years than from 12 years to 13.
The effect of an additional year of education is, however, only very slightly decreasing
over the different values, so an additional year of education matters a little less for your
concern about climate change the more education you already have. The probability that
urban residents are concerned about climate change is .034 higher than for their rural
counterparts. When the country fixed effects are not included (see Appendix B), years of
education exhibits an unexpected sign, which implies that the education variable in
column 1 is picking up some systematic country differences that the fixed effects model
controls for. In addition, urban residence is not statistically significant in the model
without fixed effects. Both these results seem to confirm the decision to use a fixed
effects model, and subsequent results will be presented only with the fixed-effects
models.
Being unfamiliar with climate change science has the single largest effect on a
the probability of being concerned about climate change: the probability of being
concerned is .21 lower for individuals who respond incorrectly that using coal or oil or
gas does not contribute to the greenhouse effect. This story coincides very well with the
theoretical predictions of the model: individuals who are unfamiliar with a certain risk
tend to be less likely to associate the risk with something that requires precaution.
One surprising result is the fact that household income appears to be negatively
related to individuals' attitudes. One explanation for this phenomenon might be the
argument that generational value changes towards postmaterialism only work through a
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rising tide that is lifting all boats, not through individual increases in income. This would
contradict standard economic theory, however, which predicts that demand for a non
inferior good should increase with income. It is possible that these results are consistent
with Steininger's findings (2002) that concern for distant effects decreases with income.
The Steininger effects might work against the typical expected wealth effects, in this case
outweighing the income effect and resulting in a negative overall effect. In other words it
seems as though the different attributes of climate change complicate the role of income.
Demand for global, public and long-term goods are also important, and
respondents' demand for global goods matters a great deal: individuals with an affinity
for the global community have a probability of being concerned about climate change
that is .14 higher than those who do not. In general, this model strongly supports the
expectation that the individual attributes of climate change do in fact matter in attitude
formation.
The statistical significance of the coefficients on religious beliefs disappears when
fixed effects are introduced., but liberal political values increase the probability of being
concerned about climate change by .08. The lack of significance of religious beliefs may
or may not be surprising to the reader. Religious beliefs have been discussed intensely,
particularly in the sociological literature, but no consensus has been reached on their
importance. These results would indicate that the differences in environmental attitudes
that have sometimes been attributed to religious differences may be capturing systematic
country differences due to other social, political, economic or cultural factors. Because
the variation in religious beliefs is so heavily correlated with the countries it is difficult to
isolate the separate effects of religious beliefs. For the purposes of this analysis the
distinction is not of primary importance, but interesting to Dote.
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TABLE 7 - PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR GREENHOUSE ATTITUDE
Independent Variable

IGNORANCE A

IGNORANCEB

Affinity for the global community a

0.140···
(0.058)

0.161···
(0.058)

Support for public goods °

0.062·...•
(0.032)

0.062·"
(0.032)

Low demand for long-term goods a

-(J,on"·
(0.032)

-0.110"·
(0.032)

Years of education

0.005···
(0.004)

0.006·"
(0.004)

Unfamiliarity with climate change science °

-0.209*'"
(0.040)

0.073 ...•
(0.032)

Belonging to an Abrahamic religion°

-0.005
(0.035)

-0.011
(0.036)

Buddhism or Hinduism a

0.024
(0.155)

0.004
(0.170)

0.080.....
(0.033)

0.083···
(0.033)

Per capita household income

-0.024·"
(0.020)

-0.026·"
(0.021)

Age afrespondent

-0.002···
(0.001)

-0.002"·
(0.001)

Liberal political vieM'

Urban residence

a

a

0.034"·
(0.033)
n
8934
Pseudo R2 0.1227

0.036·"
(0.033)
n 8699
Pseudo R2 0.1\26

Notes:
The above coefficients are the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probabiliry of
believing that the greenhouse effect is dangerous.
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Coefficient is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1
... 99% significance
... 95% significance
... 90% significance
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Robustness ofEstimates
The aforementioned results are robust to a number of changes in the model specification.
In the results that are shown, the dependent variable is constructed from an answer with
ordered categories (the greenhouse effect is extremely dangerous, very dangerous,
somewhat dangerous, etc.), and takes on the value of 1.0 if the respondent considers the
greenhouse effect extremely or very dangerous for the environment. The original
motivation for constructing a dummy variable was the belief that belonging to the group
of people who are concerned about the greenhouse effect is more important than the
relative differences between answering extremely or very dangerous. The outcomes are
consistent, however, if an ordered. probit model is employed. They are similarly
consistent if the dependent variable is recoded to take on a 1.0 only for individuals who
indicate that the greenhouse effect is extremely dangerous, or if respondents who think
the greenhouse effect is only somewhat dangerous are included. (see Appendix C) The
only significant change is that Years of education is slightly less significant when the
dependent variable only includes those respondents who think: that the greenhouse effect
is extremely dangerous. Similarly, all coefficients of binary independent variables in
Table 7 are based on the respondent agreeing or strongly agreeing with the statement in
question, but the results are robust if these variables are recoded. In other words, the
results are insensitive to coding choices.
An additional robustness check was conducted using the two unfamiliarity
variables: relating how coal and oil and gas impact the greenhouse effect, and relating
climate change to a hole in the ozone layer. Column 2 contains a measure ofunfantiliarity
that is based on the respondent's belief that the greenhouse effect is cause by a hole in the
ozone layer. At first, the significantly positive sign of this variable presented a paradox,
since we expect respondents who are ignorant about climate change to be less worried
about it.
Further reflection, however, offers a reasonable way to resolve the paradox.
Consider a respondent who believes that the greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the
ozone layer, and keep in mind the fact that the Antarctic ozone hole has received a lot of
media attention. If we think: that the amount of media exposure that a particular
environmental issue gets affects how concerned an individual is about the issue, then this
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variable could in fact be capturing the fact that someone who believes that ozone holes
and climate change are closely linked would essentially notice twice as much attention
given to the issue than someone who knows that the two issues are separate. It therefore
seems as though this measure of unfamiliarity is inadequate and my other measure is
preferred, but it raises a noteworthy point about how having access to information and
having access to accurate information are not necessarily identica1. 10

Determinants of Individual Actions

As a second perspective on the determinants of environmentalism, the dependent variable

Drive less is investigated. This variable is based upon whether or not respondents report
that they often or always cut back on driving a car for environmental reasons. This is a
measure of personal actions, and it allows some consideration of the degree to which
attitudes are complemented by personal actions. Grunert and Juhl (1995) make the case
that values and attitudes are criteria that are used to justify actions. The authors argue that
values can be viewed as representing motivations because of their function as social
cognitions that help us know and understand - and consequently act upon - things in the
world around us. They subsequently try to assess the potential of values to predict
behavior by surveying Danish school teachers for environmental attitudes and their
propensity to buy organic food. They find a clear correlation between the organic food
buying frequency and environmental attitudes, but unfortunately do not control for many
other variables in their analysis.
Duroy (2005), in his investigation of environmental attitudes and behaviors,
lumps together a number of survey questions pertaining to both environmental attitudes
and behavior to evaluate their determinants. What follows can be seen as a different way
of examining the link between attitudes and behavior that Grunert and JuhI (1995) look

at, and as a test of Duroy's approach.

10 Further, the above estimations use a normal probit model because the most important difference is
thought to be rather dichotomous, and exist berween individuals who believe and those who do 001 believe
that climate change is dangerous. An ahernative would have beeo 10 use an ordered probit model, since
there are more than two responses to the question. The results do not cbange significantly if an ordered
probit is employed for the estimation.
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TABLE 8 - PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR DRiVE LESS
Independent Variable

With Country Fixed Effects

Affinityfor the global lXJmmunityD

Support for public goods

0.012
(0.069)

Q

0.022*"
(0.037)

Low demand for long-term goods D

-0.002
(0.037)
0.045·$$

Greenhouse Attitude

(0.037)

Years ofeducation

0.002"
(0.005)

Unfamiliarity with climate change science II

-0.004
(0.048)

Belonging to an Abrahamic religion

-0.013·
(0.040)

Q

Buddhism or Hinduism D

0.04
(0.158)

Liberal political views

0.019*'10

II

(0.039)

Per capita household income

-0.016**·
(0.024)

Age ofrespondent

0.001"·
(0.001)

Urban residence II

0.013'"
(0.037)
n
8898
Pseudo R 2 0.0582

Notes:
The above coefficients are the marginal effects of the independent variables on the
probability of being willing to payor accept.
Standard errors in parentheses.
II Coefficient is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to I
••• 99% significance
•• 95% significance
* 90% significance
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Table 8 shows the results of a probit regression of the same independent variables
as

1.D

the previous attitudes model, on a left-hand side variable that indicates an

environmentally friendly action. The measure of unfamiliarity with climate change
science is the measure that was deemed superior in Table 7 (a dummy variable for
believing or not believing the statement "every time we use coal or oil or gas, we
contribute to the greenhouse effect").
Some very interesting results emerge. Although we notice that the model overall
produces a worse fit than when attitudes is the dependent variable, some of the
determinants of attitudes also seem to predict environmentally friendly behavior in the
expected directions. In

additio~

environmental attitudes are themselves a positive and

significant determinant of individuals' decisions to drive less. Table 8 shows us that
support for public goods, positive environmental attitudes, years of education, liberal
political views, household income, as well as the age of the respondent are statistically
significant determinants ofwbether or Dot a respondent will tend to cut down on driving a
car for environmental reasons.
Age, however, has a positive (albeit small) sign, the opposite of what we find for
attitudes towards climate change. One additional year increases the probability of cutting
down on driving for environmental reasons by .001. One possible explanation for this,
consistent with the age hypothesis, has to do with the nature of the environmentally
friendly behavior in question. The age hypothesis states that older people are less likely
to support solutions to environmental problems because the solutions are often seen as
threatening an established social order, and older individuals are more integrated in that
social order. Cutting down on driving, however, is a way of limiting one's impact on the
environment that is rather uncontroversial and un-threatening to the social order, and
therefore might appeal to older individuals, whereas younger individuals choose other
means. In addition, the polluting effects of driving can be perceived as immediate,
whereas the effe<:ts of climate change are delayed, perhaps beyond the lifetime of the
senior respondent.
Also noteworthy is the fact that neither an individual's global concerns, as
measured by a positive attitude towards binding international environmental agreements,
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nor his or her attitudes towards the future, are statistically significant predictors of the
probability that he or she will cut down on driving a car. A preference for public goods,
however, is - it increases the probability of driving less by .022. This might in fact be due
to people's perceptions of why they ought to drive less. While cars emit greenhouse gases

into the atmosphere, they also account for a lot of local air pollution, such as nitrogen
oxides and carbon monoxide. U people think of cutting down on driving as a way of
reducing local air pollution, then they are acting in a way that contributes to a current
public good., but they may not necessarily be acting upon preferences for long-term or
global environmental services.
Household income is negatively related to this dependent variable too. Since the
motivations for cutting down on driving seem to be more related to the local effects of
pollution and congestion than the distant effects of climate change, the effects noticed by
Steininger (2002) that environmental concern for distant environmental problems
decreases with income do not apply. The negative effect of income on the probability of
driving less is therefore harder to explain.
This model shows us that taking for granted a total similarity between
envirorunental attitudes and behavior might lead to less informative results, as some of
the detenninants affect the two differently. On the whole, however, it does seem that
people with positive attitudes towards the environment and those who actively behave in
an environmentally friendly way have many characteristics in cornmon. Whether this
connection between attitudes and actions prevails in national actions to control climate
change will be assessed in section 5.

Determinants of Willingness to Pay

Table 9 presents the results for the different types of willingness to pay (WTP) that were
asked in the survey: willingness to pay much higher prices, willingness to pay much
higher taxes, and willingness to accept a lower standard of living to protect the
environment. Only the results of the fixed effects models are shown in the table, as an
analysis of the differences between the models with and without fixed effects was found
to be rather uninformative and the fixed effects models are preferred.
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Duroy (2005) finds in a cross-country analysis of WTP for environmental services
that very few of his demographic indicators are significant determinants of individuals'
WTP for the environment. This could possibly arise from the fact that his measure of
WTP is a general one, bringing together several different attributes. To investigate this,
the models estimated here examine the differences between three different types of WTP.
Also, since the independent variables are the same as in the model that explores the
predictors of environmental attitudes, comparing how significant these are in determining
willingness to pay gives us another way of looking at the similarities between
determinants of attitudes and ofwillingness to pay.
Table 9 shows that several of the variables that predict an individual's
environmental attitudes also predict their WTP to protect the environment. Preferences
for global goods, preferences for public goods, cautious attitudes vis-it-vis climate
change, liberal political views, and years of education are positively related to all three
measures of WTP, and a low demand for long-term goods negatively affects the
probability of being willing to pay for the environment. Being concerned about climate
change increases the probability of all three WTP measures by between .023-.043.
Significantly, household income is statistically significant only in detennining
individuals' WTP higher prices for environmental protectio~ but has no significant effect
on the two other measures. The effect of income is small, with a I-percent increase in
monthly income being associated with a .00005 change in the probability that the
respondent declares that he or she is willing to pay higher prices to protect the
environment. It is interesting to note that the WTP higher taxes and to accept a cut in
one's standard of living are not associated with household income. One possible
explanation for the measure that asks about taxes is that, although some wealthier
individuals are more able and willing to deal with cuts in their disposable income, others
might feel that it would hit them disproportionately, especially if they have a progressive
tax scheme in mind. As for cuts in one's standard of living, there are no obvious reasons
why it would be correlated with income, so the insignificance is not surprising.
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TABLE 9 - PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR WlLUNGNESS TO PA Y
WILLINGNESS
TO PAY
MUCH
HIGHER
PRICES

WILLINGNESS
TO PAY MUCH
HIGHER TAXES

WILLINGNESS
TO ACCEPT
LOWER
STANDARD OF
LIVING

Affinityfor the global community"

0.025···
(0.098)

0.015"
(0.113)

0.032·...
(0.116)

Support lor public goods"

0.020·"
(0.047)

0.008"
(0.054)

0.019···
(0.050)

WW demand/or long-term goods"

-0.015·"
(0.049)

-0.010·"
(0.057)

-0.011· ...
(0.051 )

Greenhouse Attitude

0.043···
(0.049)

0.023·"
(0.056)

0.033··...
(0.051 )

0.003···
(0.006)

0.003"'··
(0.007)

0.002···
(0.006)

Un/amilian'ty with climate change science"

0.002
(0.062)

-0.008
(0.076)

0.001
(0.066)

Belonging to an Abra Iulm ic religion"

-0.0005
(0.052)

-0.004
(0.060)

0.003
(0.056)

Buddhism or Hinduism D

0.003
(0.193)

0.004
(0.237)

0.026
(0.202)

Liberal political views "

0.010"
(0.048)

0.011"·
(0.056)

0.016···
(0.052)

Per capita household inrome

0.005·
(0.028)

0.002
(0.032)

-0.003
(0.030)

0.0004"·
(0.001)

0.0001
(0.002)

-0.0002
(0.001)

0.002
(0.056)
n
8934
Pseudo R 2 0.089

0.0002
(0.050)
n
8934
Pseudo R2 0.081

Independent Variable

Yean

0/ education

Age a/respondent

Urban residence a

0.004
(0.048)
n
8934
Pseudo R 2 0.064

Notes:
The above coefficientS are the marginal effects of the independent variables on the probability of being
willing to payor accept
Standard errors in parentheses.
a Coefficient is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1
..... 99% significance
•• 95% significance
• 90% significance
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5.2 The Policy Model

The previous models established a number of political, socio-economic and demographic
determinants of environmental attitudes, and the fact that environmental attitudes indeed
seem to matter in delennining whether individuals are willing to act individually to
decrease their impact on the environment, and whether they are likely to be willing to pay

in different ways to protect the environment. Other studies have also looked into this
issue, but the model that follows asks the next logical question: do environmental
attitudes matter in the implementation of national policies? If so, what factors affect the
degree of influence? Even though the fonnation of attitudes is a fascinating topic in and
of itself, it would certainly carry much more weight if we had some evidence that
individuals' attitudes actually have an impact on the way countries behave with regard to
environmental issues.
Table 10 shows the results from the OLS regression of countries' changes in
greenhouse gas emissions in the three years preceding the !SSP survey on a number of
independent variables. Column 1 shows the results of a basic model, Column 2 shows the
preferred model, which includes variables measuring freedom of the press and the
percentage of people in a country who trust government information on pollution, as well
as an interaction term between the level of press freedom and environmental attitudes.
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TABLE 10 - OLS REGRESSIONS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

Independent Variable

COLUMN I

COLUMN 2

-0.304*"
(0.087)

-0.490·
(0.301)

Time preference

0.012**
(0.005)

0.006
(0.004)

Per capita GDP

-0.00000306*·
(0.000)

-0.00000152
(0.000)

Greenhouse altitudes

Share oftotal energy consumption from
coal in 1990

-0.311*.. b
(0.093)

-0.378..•
(0.083)

Freedom ofthe press

0.030**
(0.012)

Govemment trust

-0.339··
(0.160)

n

1f2

18
0.588

b

-0.053"
(0.020)
n
18
2
li. 0.744

Notes:
Standard errors in parentheses
b Significance from a two-tailed t-test
••• 99% significance
··95% significance
* 90% significance

OveraJI, given the number of observations and the fact that the data are cross
sectional, the fit of the equation is noteworthy, and several of the theoretically important
variables are statistically significant and of the expected signs. Briefly, individual
concerns about climate change in a country are significantly associated with lower
greenhouse gases. A one percentage-point increase of people in a country who think that
climate change is an important issue is associated with a .49 percentage point reduction in
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greenhouse gas emissions. Keeping in mind that the mean reduction in the sample over
the three-year period is 9.8 percent, that is a significant reduction.

If a country's press freedom score increases by one point, it appears to be
associated with a .03 increase in greenhouse gas emissions. The reader might be struck by
the fact that the C()efficient on freedom of the press is positive, implying that a higher
level of freedom of the press would be associated with an increase, or a smaller
reduction, in a

c()UDtry'S

greenhouse gases. However, it is a mistake to consider this

variable independently of the interaction term. The effect of the press can only be
considered by taking the two tenns together. The variables Press freedom and the
interaction term between Press freedom and Greenhouse attitudes are jointly significant
and, the marginal effect of attitudes is negative over all values of Press freedom. II This
implies that the magnitude of the marginal effect of environmental attitudes depends
upon the level of press freedom in a country.
Also, the percentage of people who trust government information on pollution has
a significant effect on greenhouse gas emissions. A one percentage-point increase in the
number of people who trust their government is associated with a .34 percentage-point
reduction in emissions. The share of total energy consumption from coal in 1990 has a
similar effect - a one percentage-point increase in the share of coal is associated with a
.38 percentage point reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
Significantly, it appears from these results that attitudes do matter in the
implementation of national policy, but that they are far from the only important factor,
and that they do not operate in isolation. Different kinds of democratic channels also
matter a great deal in the translation of these attitudes into policy - the access to a free
press, and the existence of a government that you can trust - seem to be vital pieces in the
puzzle. The variable that measures people's trust in governments' information on
pollution is also significantly associated with a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
This could indicate that, beyond the kind of infonnation you have access to, and no
matter what your preferences, whether you trust your government to act on your
preferences is importanl One story that could be told about the importance of this

II

The marginal effect of attitudes for different levels of freedom of the press is calculated as follows:

/31+ /37 '" Press Freedom
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variable is that a government that is not believed to supply trustworthy information on
such basic issues as pollution is likely to fail its population on fulfilling other duties too.
Underlying structural differences also seem to matter in determining how
successful a country is in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, since the share of energy
consumption from coal turns out to be a crucial predictor of that success. It seems as
though coal, rather than making it hard for countries to reduce their emissions, provides
them with a window of opportunity for relatively low cost fuel switching, substituting
other available technologies for coal in electrical generation.
Following a similar line of reasoning~ some countries with high amounts of
nuclear energy have argued that treaties such as the Kyoto protocol will put them at a
disadvantage~
emissions~

as they have already invested in nuclear energy to reduce greenhouse gas

and that reducing them further will be hard - they have already taken

advantage of this window of opportunity and now would bear much higher costs. To test
this, the importance of nuclear energy as a share of energy production was included
instead of the Coal share variable, but was not found to be significant in any specification
of the model. The reason for this might be the lack of variation in the sample, but it
indicates that the difficulty for these countries to further reduce greenhouse gas emissions
might have been exaggerated.
The per capita GDP of a country does not appear to matter in this specification,
however. Since most of the economic literature to date has focused on the importance of
country-level wealth in detennining the degree of environmentalism, this is a remarkable
resultY

12 One insight that urges caution in interpreting this result. however, is that it may mainly be a product of
the high correlation between per capita GDP and the amount of press freedom in a country. The percentage
of people who drive less is also highly correlated with per capita GDP. Indeed, when freedom of the press,
the interaction term with attitudes, and the percentage of people who drive less to reduce their
environmental impact are excluded from the specification, country GDP gains some significance. The other
variables are important to the model, however, and the fit of the equation drops radically if these variables
are excluded so this specification does not seem interesting for our purposes. It does indicate, however, that
wealth may maner more than we can see here.
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6. DISCUSSION

National Policy
The most striking result oftbis study is the fact that individuals' attitudes towards climate
change are in fact associated with lowered greenhouse gas emissions, and that democratic
institutions and structural conditions have important functions in the implementation of
climate change policies.
I will return to the discussion about the determinants of individual attitudes, but
first want to focus on the role of attitudes in policy. No other study has investigated the
effect of individuals' attitudes on national policies, and the finding that attitudes about
climate change matter is an important one for anyone who takes an interest in climate
change issues, attitude fonnalion, or the implementation of national policy.
The role of attitudes is mediated by the democratic composition of a country. If a
nation has a free press, the attitudes of its citizens are much more likely to be translated
into action, as evidenced by the significance of the interaction term between press
freedom and attitudes. This may be because a greater variety of infonnation and more
diverse ways of expressing one's opinion are available to citizens in countries with a freer
press. A freer press in this context entails not only minimal political control over the
content of news media, but also the existence of legal and constitutional guarantees for
freedom of expression, and how media ownership is structured.
Thus, having a free press without state or self-censorship would ensure that the
information that citizens receive is varied and multifaceted, but a corollary of this is that
citizens will also be uninhibited in their rights to express their opinions. Having a free
press in the sense that media ownership is transparent ensures that state or industry
interests, for example, are not allowed to detennine what is printed in the national media.
Hence, we can see why attitudes would matter differently within different media
frameworks.
Additionally, the results show that in countries in which citizens have a higher
level of trust in their government, reductions of greenhouse gas emissions are more
successful. This might be, in a sense, a self-reported measure of the actual, perceived
democratic structure of a country.
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In addition, channels and societal structures seem to matter for how successful
countries are in reducing their emissions. The result that countries with a higher historical
reliance on coal for energy production have been more successful in reducing their
greenhouse gas emissions suggests that if substitutes are available, countries are much
more likely to switch from dirty production processes to cleaner ones. It is important,
however, to keep in mind that the sample is drawn mainly from OEeD countries, as the
wealth of a country will affect the resources that the countries have available to them in
switching technologies. This may sound like common sense, but knowing the extent to
which it seems to matter is a powerful incentive to invest in technologies that roay
provide countries with more easily available clean alternatives.
Most researchers who study attitudes, perceptions and preferences do so because
they sense that what people believe matters beyond the individuals' lives. To my
knowledge, little - if any - research bas been carried out investigating to what extent
attitudes about envirorunental protection actually matter, particularly on a national level.
The finding that people's attitudes matter on a country-wide level is one that, to my mind,
justi fies the study of attitudes.

Individual Attitudes and Behaviors
Having established that attitudes are in fact an important component in how national
policies are implemented, a better understanding of the factors that influence these
policies seems even more important than before.
From the analysis of the determinants of individual attitudes toward climate
change, several intriguing results emerge. It seems clear that individual demographic
characteristics are, as expected, important predictors of environmental attitudes, but the
characteristics of the environmental good in question do matter. A person's preference
for the specific and somewhat unique attributes that characterize climate change turns out
to be an important determinant of their concern for climate change. People who express a
disregard for consequences occurring far in the future are less likely to be concerned
about climate change. Similarly, having a high demand for global, public goods increases
the probability that people will be concerned about climate change.
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The results for the probability of consciously cutting down on driving to protect
the environment are slightly different, but the differences in fact seem to provide
additional support for the importance of attributes. Whereas in my results a high demand
for public goods increases the probability of cutting down on driving, the demand for
global and long-term goods have no effect on it. If we think about the attributes of the
behavior in question, cutting down on driving might be perceived as contributing to a
more local and short-tenn environmental good, since driving adds to local air pollution.
Exhibiting concern for the global, long-lived aspects of environmental issues might
therefore not be an important part of someone's decision to drive less, whereas the public
goods aspect is stiU a highly related preference.
The finding that attributes matter is important not only for policy, but also for the
practice of environmental valuation. One of the debates surrounding the use of
environmental valuation methods for policy decision-making ,concerns the validity of the
conclusions drawn from such examinatioDS. Since both the conjoint and hedonic
approaches to valuation of the environment assess consumers' values of environmental
goods based on the characteristics of that good, support for the link between attributes
and preferences reinforces the increasing emphasis being placed on those techniques.
From a policy perspective, support for this link also implies that influencing people's
preferences about certain issues may have implications for their preferences regarding
other goods that exhibit similar characteristics.
This research also provides an empirical confinnation of the importance of
Susnstein's concept of cognitive availability as it relates to both attitudes about and
actions taken to reduce the risk of climate change, In this study, variables have been
included to capture both respondents' familiarity with the risk, i.e. their education and
their [ami liarity with the science of climate change, and the salience of the risk, measured
by where respondents live. As expected, the results suggest that the familiarity gained
through education is likely to both increase people's concern with the environment, to
motivate personal actions, and to enhance people's willingness to pay to protect the
environment.
Whereas general education has an important effect on all these three aspects of
environmentalism, familiarity about climate change science affects only people's
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concerns about that particular issue. Being ignorant about the specific science behind
climate change diminishes individual concern about the issue. Individuals who are
unfamiliar with the particular risk are less likely to associate it with something that needs
to be dealt with. Unfamiliarity with climate change science is not a significant
determinant of whether people cut down on driving to protect the environment. If we
assume that individuals do not always make the connection between driving and climate
change, this is in fact quite logical. Similarly, the different measures of individuals'
willingness to pay to pmtoct the environment

are not influenced by a respondents'

familiari,ty with climate change science. The Sl!lIVey question about willingness to pay
asks about protecting the environment in general, and does not mention climate change
specifically, this result is not very surprising, as general education is already controlled
for.
From a policy perspective, this has a number of important implications. First,
education matters. The more we know about the world around us, the more likely we are
to care about important risks facing the planet and humanity. Importantly, it also seems to
matter what our education focuses on. Based on these results, increasing the amount of
information about the environment that citizens receive, perhaps particularly through case
studies, might have a significant impact on their concern for the environment.
The fact that urban residency matters, even after controlling for educational and
income differences, lends support to the idea that the salience of a risk is also an
important factor. According to this analysis, the immediacy of environmental risks
appears to have greater weight than household income. It might be the case that the
relationship between the different attributes of climate change and income work in
different directions, and therefore complicate the role of income. On the one hand,
according to standard econonllc theory, an increase in income would lead to an increased
demand for nonnal goods, such as environmental services. On the other hand,
Steininger's findings on spatially distant environmental effects imply that higher income
groups are less likely to be concerned about these kinds of goods. The reasons for this
reversed income effect warrant some further thought, and future research might
investigate whether income differences occurring over time rather than in cross-sectional
samples also lead to lower preferences for distant environmental goods.

53
~--

-

---

Further, the age hypothesis finds support in this study. Older people are less likely
to be concerned about climate change. Since some of the solutions proposed to halt

climate change could be considered threatening to the prevailing social and economic
order and current lifestyles, older people, who are more integrated in that order, might be
less willing to accept it as a threat that needs to be dealt with. If we accept this
explanation, we will also note that the status of solutions to environmental problems in
the media and in political discourse becomes crucial to its acceptance by different age
groups. Integrating environmental issues into a more mainstream dialogue, and
presenting solutions that would be acceptable to different groups within society could be
good strategies for increasing their support.
The same is true for political orientation. Whereas religion does not seem to play
a role in determining environmental attitudes, liberal political views do matter. The fact
that individuals exhibiting liberal political values are much more likely to demonstrate
environmental concern could be seen as support for a link between liberal political views
and postrnaterialist values, as has been proposed in the literature. Another reason for this
might be that the attributes of climate change become closely intertwined with political
ideologies. Since attitudes toward public and global goods are so important in the
formation of one's attitudes on climate change, and therefore also nations' policies, they
will also be closely associated with people's beliefs about the role of government and of
international organizations. This could be seen as an indicator of the need to present
environmental issues in a nonpartisan framework., as they are problems that will affect all
humans, regardless of political orientation.
Although no clear patterns become apparent that can explain all of the sample
countries' behavior or their respective decisions to sign or not to sign the Kyoto protocol,
stories can be told. The US, for example, is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, and
has yet to sign the Kyoto protocol or commit to any significant reductions. The
percentage of people among the US respondents who report concern about climate
change is below the mean in the sample. This is also true for the percentage of people
who trust government information on pollution, another important factor climate change
policy that emerges from this research. One of the reasons for the low level of concern
about climate change may be that a disproportionate amount of the US respondents were
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also unfamiliar with the science behind climate change, one of the most important
predictors of individual attitudes toward climate change. Whereas attitudes are
notoriously hard to affect, this last point is one that can (and should) be addressed by
making available basic and accurate information about climate change.
The possibility of breaking down countries' policies and actions into smaller
components as in the previous paragraph is, to my mind, one very important motivation
for continuing research on the topic of attitude formation, and on the role of attitudes in
policy. The finding that the role of income seems to be particularly complicated as
applied to attitudes and actions on climate change warrants further research. Other
directions for future research might be studies of individuals' willingness to pay for
climate change, keeping in mind the three unique attributes of climate change discussed
in this study.
It has always seemed to me that one of the biggest obstacles for activism, or even
getting citizens to vote in their countries' elections, is a severe coordination failure. Most
individuals don't think that they can make a difference. Because they don't think they can
make a difference, they choose not to act upon their beliefs or attitudes or political
preferences. Because they don't act upon their beliefs, there aren't enough votes or
people or acts to make the votes or actions or mobilizations of other citizens effective.
So, in effect, the belief that individuals can't make a difference becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy. What this study does is provide evidence against this crippling idea that
individuals don't matter. Individuals' attitudes do have an effect on countries' policies on
something as complicated as climate change policy. This, if anything, is an empowering
finding - what you believe matters.
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Appendix A - Data
Below are all the variables in the Attitude models, and their CXlITesponding variables in
the ISSP Codebook.

VARIABLE

ISSP VARIABLE

Greenhouse auitudes

v38

Drive Less

v57

Willingness to pay higher prices

v19

Willingness to pay higher taxes

v20

Willingness to accept lower standard ofliving

v21

Affinityfor the global community

v46

Support for public goods

v5

Low demand for long-tenn goods

vll

Years ofeducation

v204

Familiarity with climate change science (A)

v32

Familiarity with climate change science (B)

v31

Belonging to an Abrahamic religion

v242

Buddhism or Hinduism

v242

Liberal political views

v246

Per capita household income ($)

v241

Age ofrespondent

v201

Urban residence

v63

Household Income:
There were differences in how the different survey countries asked about household
income, ranging from yearly to weekly, with the most common being monthly.
Consequently, the yearly income figures were divided by 12 to approximate a monthly
income measure, even though this cannot take into account issues like recall bias.
Further, the incomes were divided by the exchange rate in 2000 (data from the Penn
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World Tables), again by the PPP adjustor (also from PWT), and multiplied by 100, to
facilitate interpretation of the coefficients since the scale would otherwise be in cents
rather than dollars.

Greenhouse gas emissions;:

Data are in metric tons of CCh per million constant 1995 United States dollars. is on CO2
per GDP in 1997 and in 2000, the three years preceding the survey. From this, a
percentage change in greenhouse gas emissions is constructed. as follows:

C0 2 perGDP2000 - C02 perGDP1997
CO 2 perGDP1997
Again, the data COl per GDP measure the quantity of carbon dioxide (C02 ) released into
the atmosphere for each million dollars of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in each
country. CO2 emissions data used here represent the mass of CO 2, a greenhouse gas
produced during the combustion of solid, liquid, and gaseous fuels, as well as from the
manufacture of cement and gas flaring.

C~

emission values presented here do not

include emissions from land use change or emissions from bunker fuels used in
international transportation. Values were converted to CO 2 equivalent values from
original values showing the mass of elemental carbon; WRl multiplied. the original
carbon mass by 3.66419 (the ratio of the molecular mass of C02 to that of carbon).

Freedom ofthe press:

Freedom House scores countries' press freedom on the basis of a set of 23 methodology
questions,

divided

into

three

subcategories:

"Legal

Environment,"

"Political

Environment," and "Economic Environment". The degree to which each country permits
the free flow of news and information determines the classification of its media as "Free,"
"Partly Free," or "Not Free." Countries scoring 0 to 30 are regarded as having "Free"
media; 31 to 60, "Partly Free" media; and 61 to 100, "Not Free" media. 13 This variable
was constructed by inverting the order of the scores so that the highest score is the
country with the freest press.

13 From Freedom House - Publications - Freedom of the Press - Methodology.
URL: hop ://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?Page=56&year=2005
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Appendix B - Regressions without country fiXed effects

Independent Variable
Affinityfor the global
community

Dependent Variable - Greenhouse Attitudes
Unfamiliarity A
Unfamiliarity B
Marginal
Standard PMarginal Standard
Error
value
Error
P-value Effect
Effect

Support for public goods
Low demand for long-term
goods
Years of education
Unfamiliarity with climate
change science
Belonging to an Abrahamic
religion
Buddhism or Hinduism
Liberal political views
Per capita household income
Age ofrespondent
Urban residence

0.132

0.055

0.000

0.159

0.055

0.000

0.039

0.030

0.001

0.042

0.030

0.000

-0.062
-0.003

0.030
0.004

0.000
0.025

-0.082
-0.002

0.031
0.004

0.000
0.116

-0.206

0.038

0.000

0.096

0.031

0.000

-0.019

0.028

0.078

-0.018

0.029

0.090

0.179

0.119

0.000

0.189

0.130

0.000

0.072
-0.059
-0.001

0.030
0.011
0.001

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.075
-0.055
-0.001

0.031
0.012
0.001

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.013
n

0.031

0.254
8934

0.015

0.031

0.217
8699

n
Pseudo
R2

0.053

Pseudo R

2

0.0446
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Dependent Variable - Drive Less
Marginal
pStandard
Independent Variable
Effect
Error
value
Affinity for the global community
0.007
0.067 0.672
Support for public goods
0.013
0.035 0.131
Low demand for long-term goods
0.002
0.036 0.776
Greenhouse attitudes
0.054
0.035
0
Years ofeducation
0.000
0.004 0.692
Unfamiliarity with climate change
science
-0.003
0.047 0.769
Belonging to an Abrahamic religion
0.021
0.033
0.01
Buddhism or Hinduism

0.048

0.120

0.126

Liberal political views
Per capita household income
Age ofrespondent

0.027
0.030
0.001

0.036
0.014
0.001

0.002
0
0

-0.003
n

0.036
8898
0.0199

0.75

Urban residence

Pseudo R2
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Appendix C - Robustness Checks
Results for ordered probit regression

Dependent Variable - Greenhouse Attitudes

p-

Coefficient

Standard
Error

value

Affinity for the global community

-0.377

0.046

0.000

Support for public goods

-0.148

0.026

0.000

Low demand for long-term goods

0.248

0.026

0.000

Years ofeducation
Unfamiliarity with climate change
science

-0.010

0.003

0.002

0.530

0.033

0.000

Belonging to an Abrahamic religion

0.021

0.029

0.472

Buddhism or Hinduism

0.025

0.121

0.836

Liberal political views
Per capita household income

-0.189
0.063

0.027
0.016

0.000
0.000

Age ofrespondent

0.005

0.001

0.000

Urban residence

-0.088

Independent Variable

0.001
0.026
n 8934
0.0728
Pseudo R 2
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Probit Regression, Dependent Variable Recoded

1 = Extremely Dangerous,
Very Dangerons, and
Somewbat Dangerous
Standard
P-value
ME
Error

Affinity for the global
community
Support for public
goods
Low demand for
long*term goods
Years ofeducation
Unfamiliarity with
climate change
science
Belonging to an
Abrahamic religion
Buddhism or
Hinduism
Liberal political

1 = Only Extremely
DangeroDs

ME

Standard
Error

P-value

0.065

0.069

0.000

0.104

0.068

0.000

0.009

0.046

0.098

0.048

0.033

0.000

-0.045
0.002

0.045
0.006

0.000 0.058
0.025 0.002

0.034
0.004

0.000
0.123

-0.119

0.048

0.000

0.102

0.046

0.000

0.003

0.051

0.585

0.015

0.037

0.187

0.026

0.277

0.338

0.041

0.143

0.308

0.030

0.047

0.000

0.043

0.035

0.000

Per capita household
income

-0.008

0.029

0.017

0.018

0.021

0.004

Age ofrespondent

-0.001

0.001

0.000 0.002

0.001

0.000

Urban residence

0.001

0.048

0.910 0.035
8934

0.034

0.000
8934

VIewS

n
Pseudo

R2

0.1523

n
Pseudo

R2

0.0809
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